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Introduction
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus lie geographically and geo-economically between 
the Atlantic core states and the Far East. They are attracted in two directions – 
by the capital rich Atlantic core, which seeks new locations for investment and 
by East Asia which wants these countries’ energy supplies, primary and semi 
processed goods. Thus it is understandable that the present global crisis should 
have appeared in these countries in the summer and autumn of 2008 first as a 
collapse of their external commodities markets located mainly in the East, fol-
lowed quickly by the collapse of their external sources of credit from the West.
My task here is to examine how the present global crisis unfolded in 
these three countries, what their common experience has been, and in what 
measure it has been distinct for each of them. I don’t believe that the cur-
rent crisis is over, far from it.  I’ll be looking mainly how at these countries 
have faced the crisis and responded to it so far. All of them are now recover-
ing in terms of GDP output, but insofar as this is a truly global crisis, no 
one country, no region, let alone one that accounts for less than 2% of world 
GDP1 can find a lasting solution to the problems the crisis has thrown up. 
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What Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
shared in common in the 1990s
As successor states to the USSR Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus shared in common 
their exclusion from the process of European 
integration at an institutional level since the 
early 1990s and consequently their greater 
vulnerability to competitors on world markets 
of labour, services, commodities, and capital.  
They suffered devastating domestic economic 
and social breakdowns during the 1990s and 
the 1998 financial crisis.  Their leaders were 
confused about how much the West wanted 
to help them and how much to exploit them. 
They had no viable strategies of their own 
during that decade to integrate into world 
markets on advantageous terms. They there-
fore were much more cautious and defensive 
about entering world markets than the Central 
Europeans who were offered EU member-
ship and were supported with G24 resources 
to prepare for it. After accession to the EU 
they became part of a massive single market 
and trading bloc, which naturally smoothed 
their path onto other regional markets.
Their distinct experiences 
Russia, after its bout of deep indebtedness to 
external creditors in the 1990s and the 1998 
financial crisis was particularly cautious 
about the terms of its further co-operation 
with them and was careful to limit foreign 
capital’s access to its own national economy. 
Under Putin it re-imposed central state con-
trols on FDI and on the export of oil and gas, 
while actively promoting Russian private 
capitals penetrating  neighbouring national 
economies in its near abroad. Russia chose a 
strategy to achieve regional hegemony and 
to resist Western penetration of all kinds – 
military, ideological as well as economic. And 
it built up a sizeable sovereign fund during 
the boom years (2000-2008) which was ear-
marked as insurance against any possible 
repetition of its subordination to Western 
creditors and its sovereign default in 1998.
Belarus under Lukashenka from 1994 
chose to exclude Western capital from its 
economy and to admit Russian capital instead. 
Belarus sought institutional integration with 
the Russian state, economy and regional 
security system, offering itself as a reliable 
transit territory for Russia onto world mar-
kets and as a frontline state against NATO. 
Russia, in turn, secured Belarus’s borders 
and provided it with subsidized oil and 
gas, which contributed enormously to Bela-
rus’s export earnings and its state budget. 
Ukraine under President Leonid Kuchma 
recognized by the late 1990s that it would not 
be helped by the EU or the USA to join world 
markets on advantageous terms. It then chose 
to resist foreign penetration of both Western 
and Russian capital until it created its own 
national capitalist class through privatisation 
of its state owned assets. Yet it could not resist 
considerable Russian capital penetrating its 
processing and manufacturing industries. 
Under Yushchenko, who succeeded 
Kuchma after the 2004 Orange Revolu-
tion, Ukraine opened up wide to Western 
capital investment in the belief that such 
investment would stimulate its economic-
technological modernisation, giving it a 
higher niche in the international division of 
labour,  and would act as a counterweight as 
well to Russian influence. By 2008, Ukraine 
was receiving record inflows of FDI. Over 
half of its banking capital became foreign 
owned – mainly by West European banks, 
but also (10%) by Russian state banks.2   
How did the crisis impact on 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus? 
The crisis came in a succession of waves to 
Eastern Europe: first in July-August 2008 the 
bursting of commodity asset bubbles on world 
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markets and the collapse of critical exports, 
leading to sharp cutbacks in production; then 
in September-October 2008 the freezing of 
credits to exporters, producers and consum-
ers; and finally down to the end of that year 
the devaluation of their national currencies. 
These states subsequently assumed 
responsibility for private sector debt in 
various ways and their state budgets were 
thus put under strain. But while Russia, 
Belarus and Ukraine shared much in com-
mon in terms of the impact of the crisis upon 
them they diverged quite a lot in terms of 
their policies for dealing with it. How they 
have responded so far would appear to 
have been a function of three variables:
• their relative degree of exposure to global 
markets in capital, goods and services, 
• the adequacy of their domestic resources 
and domestic demand to substitute for 
external stimuli to economic growth, 
• their individual state-economic strategies .
All three countries had enjoyed strong rates 
of growth leading up to the crisis in the sum-
mer of 2008. Growth was driven above all by 
their exports of fossil fuels, steel and chemi-
cals onto far abroad markets, but also to each 
other (their common near abroad).  Russia 
was at the heart of this exporting engine with 
its oil and gas, while Belarus and Ukraine 
served both as consumers of Russian energy 
resources and as providers of its transit routes 
further west. Belarus and Ukraine also had 
commodities of their own to send onto world 
markets, especially steel, machinery, chemicals 
and agricultural products. Apart from the 
heavy equipment and machinery that Ukraine 
and Belarus supplied to Russia, the bulk of 
the exports and re-exports of all three states 
were primary and semi processed goods. 
It was precisely the global markets of such 
goods which boomed in the years leading up 
to their collapse in August-September 2008.
The corollary of dependency on exter-
nal demand for these commodities was of 
course the insufficiency of domestic demand. 
All three countries’ economies have been 
shaped since 1991 mainly by the collapse 
of internal demand on the one hand and 
reorientation to external demand on the 
other. Their domestic markets are as a result 
insufficiently developed or diversified to 
either absorb and process these primary 
goods or substitute them with domestically 
produced goods of higher capital content. 
When the crisis struck and the asset 
bubbles on global markets burst, all three 
countries suffered big falls in external 
demand : for Russia – oil, gas, steel; for Bela-
rus – refined oil products, transited Russian 
crude oil, chemicals, machinery and heavy 
equipment; for Ukraine – steel, non-ferrous 
metals, chemicals, transited Russian oil and 
gas. As for the Ukrainian machinery and 
heavy equipment traditionally exported to 
Russia, their production had already declined 
markedly during the boom years in the face 
of intense competition from Western sup-
pliers who came onto the Ukrainian market 
in force after the Orange Revolution.3
Exposure to capital markets 
The collapse of external trade was fol-
lowed quickly by a freezing up of 
credit to producers, exporters and retail 
consumers in all three countries.   
In terms of their exposure to capital mar-
kets, Belarus was the least exposed of all three 
countries prior to the outbreak of the crisis. 
It did not rely much on external financing 
and it had, and still has, the least privatised, 
least marketized, least capitalist economy. 
However, Belarus was deeply dependent on 
the Russian economy for its receipts from 
trade and transit and for cheap energy inputs 
to its economy and society. And so it felt the 
impact of the global credit crunch through 
the medium of the Russian state and Russian 
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industries with which its enterprises traded.
Belarus suffered a trade deficit of $5bn 
in 2008 largely as a result of Russia reduc-
ing  even further ( after a 2007 reduction)  
its price subsidies for oil and gas exports 
to Belarus, as well as from the collapse of  
Belarus’ own exports – mainly to Russia,. It 
then used significant hard currency reserves 
to hold up the national currency - Rubel 
- and to close the gap in state finances. 
But Russia then took advantage of the 
crisis and applied the screws for its own 
strategic goals:  Belarus was forced to sell a 
share of Beltransgas, its national pipeline, 
to Russia’s Gazprom for $625m. It also lost 
state control of the re-export of refined oil 
products to Russian private traders. It sold 
the state owned Belpromstroibank to Russia’s 
Sberbank. These developments led to a deep 
aggravation in Russian-Belarusian relations. 
And so at the end of 2008 Belarus was forced 
to make a major foreign policy turn away 
from Russia to the IMF and the EU for help.4
Belarus took out $1bn in Eurobonds. In 
2009-10 the IMF provided $3.44bn in exter-
nal financing. In return Belarus devalued its 
currency by 20%, agreed to initiate privatisa-
tion of big state banks and enterprises, and 
to liberalise its markets, giving more access 
to western capital, and to delay increases in 
pensions and wages of state employees.  At 
the same time Belarus also got from Russia 
in 2009 a loan of some $200m plus $2bn in 
subsidies on the world price of imported oil 
and gas. The authorities in Belarus have used 
state funds, supported by external financ-
ing, to maintain living standards. These are 
comfortably high – in 2008 only 6% of its 
people lived below the poverty line. In 2010 
Belarus’ government agreed with the IMF to 
hold annual wage increases to 11%, a rather 
generous margin. But this situation can only 
be temporary unless Belarus can produce 
its way out of the downturn. With the gov-
ernment’s current account financed mainly 
through loans, Belarus’ gross external debt is 
growing rapidly – from 25% of GDP in 2008 to 
44%  in 2009 and to an estimated 52% in 2010.5 
Russia had no state debt to speak of, 
and a fairly low private sector debt. It 
was exposed to the global financial crisis, 
however, via the big Russian exporters 
who rely on international finance for the 
expansion of their production and foreign 
trade.  When global prices and demand 
for Russian oil, gas and steel collapsed, the 
productive-exporting sector stopped produc-
ing and external credits quickly dried up. 
Foreign investors in Russia were also 
spooked by the August 2008 invasion of 
Georgia, contributing to a huge capital out-
flow.  The credit freeze set in fully when 
the banks went into crisis in the Atlantic 
core states. With the collapse of world oil 
prices from $150 to $40 a barrel the Russian 
state finances faced the prospect of mount-
ing deficit spending: annual budgets were 
based mainly on proceeds from fossil fuel 
exports rather than any broad tax base. 
However, the Russian state had $600bn 
When global prices and 
demand for Russian oil, 
gas and steel collapsed, 
the productive-exporting 
sector stopped producing 
and external credits 
quickly dried up. 
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in currency reserves (sovereign fund) built 
up during the boom years. It used these 
reserves  to step down devaluation of its 
Ruble, recapitalise its banks (the top 5 are 
state owned), subsidize large firms in some 
460 one company towns under real pressure 
from the downturn, and to raise pensions 
by 25% in 2009 and 50% in 2010.  By step-
ping down the ruble slowly the state gave 
households and firms enough time to switch 
their savings into hard currencies at an 
advantageous exchange rate. In this way 
state reserves were partially privatized to 
maintain living standards and social stabil-
ity. “As a consequence, Russian household 
incomes increased during the Great Recession, 
a situation unique in global comparison.” 6
As we shall see, the opposite happened 
in Ukraine: private sector debt was partially 
nationalized, leading to a decline in living 
standards and heightening social tensions. 
Ukraine was deeply exposed to international 
capital markets. On the eve of the crisis in 
2008, with a fairly modest declared public 
debt of around  20% of GDP, it had small hard 
currency reserves for its size ($30bn) and a 
private sector debt equivalent to the 2008 
annual GDP – about $104bn. Approximately  
40% of private sector debt was short term, 
due for repayment within one year.7 Much of 
this private sector debt was placed by West 
European and Russian banks that set up in 
Ukraine after 2004 with exporting industries, 
importers, the domestic trade and real estate, 
as well as with the first generation of ordinary 
people to have credit cards and mortgages. 
Cheap credit from abroad combined with 
rising wages and state social expenditures 
all depended on the export boom in steel, 
chemicals and a few other products. When 
their bubbles burst, production collapsed, 
the credit system seized up and the private 
sector could not pay its debts, the Ukrain-
ian state was under enormous pressure from 
foreign banks and their governments as well 
as domestic banks to step in. But, unlike Rus-
sia, it had no sovereign fund to speak of, so 
turned to a number of foreign governments 
(including Russia and Japan), and finally 
went to the IMF. Taking a $16.4bn loan from 
the IMF in October 2008 the government 
recapitalized the banks, nationalised five of 
the smaller Ukrainian ones outright, settled 
their outstanding loans to foreign credi-
tors, and replaced the deposits of ordinary 
domestic savers they had lost. In this way 
the Tymoshenko-Yushchenko government 
partially nationalized the debts incurred by 
the private sector in the wake of the global 
economic downturn and financial crisis. 
By the end of 2008 Ukraine’s cur-
rency – hryvnia – fell against the US 
dollar by 40%. In 2009 Ukraine’s GDP 
fell by 15.1%, the second deepest fall that 
year in Central and Eastern Europe.8 
The Azarov-Yanukovich government 
which succeeded the ruptured Orange regime 
in 2010 took out more loans – another $15bn 
standby credit from the IMF, some $2bn raised 
in Eurobonds, and $2bn from the Russian 
VTB Bank. The new government also made 
an about turn in its foreign policy by trading 
an extension on the Russian Black Sea fleet 
lease of Sevastopol port to 2041 for cheaper 
energy supplies. It also entered into discus-
sions – reluctantly – about “merging” the 
Ukrainian and Russian oil and gas trunk lines 
and some other strategic economic assets.
In contrast to Russia , the Ukrainian state 
nationalised the private sector debts arising 
in Ukraine from the global financial crisis. 
And it had much bigger private sector debts 
to deal with than Belarus, whose private 
sector remained very small. As a direct 
result of this strategic decision the public 
debt and the total external debt of Ukraine 
have shot up, leading the government to 
take new measures that are generating  
social tensions and protests:  against cuts in 
social expenditure,  against a new Labour 
Code directed squarely against labour,  and 
against a new Tax Code (temporarily in 
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abeyance) targeting small and medium busi-
nesses, while Ukrainian big business banks 
its earnings offshore in low tax Cyprus.9          
Conclusions
In the current phase of the global finan-
cial crisis, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
face the following kinds of pressures:
- all of them are experiencing a revival 
of export demand and are responding posi-
tively to it, but none of their governments 
are working to diversify their economies  to 
respond to and stimulate domestic demand. 
-Ukraine and Belarus face big public debts, 
while Russia has failed to invest its remaining 
sovereign fund into domestic economic diver-
sification and upgrading of infrastructures.
-all of them have seen their currencies 
recover against the dollar, but are now fac-
ing even more revaluation pressures as a 
result of renewed inflows of capital from 
the Atlantic core via the carry trade (pro-
voked now by the latest QE in the US).
The QE in the USA and the ongoing crises 
of sovereign debt in the Eurozone shows the 
global financial crisis is not over. It hasn’t 
been resolved.  Finance capital continues 
to roam in and out of national markets and 
state finances looking for higher returns.
Therefore, the present recovery of GDP 
output in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine seems 
to represents the start of another cycle like 
the last one – i.e. reliant on external capital 
and external market stimuli. Without alto-
gether different public policies and strategies 
of development to guide it, this cycle will 
not lead to a positive improvement in the 
structures of production and consumption 
of these countries, in their economic security, 
or in the living standards of their people. 
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